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TEXAS LONG-ARM JURISDICTION IN FAMILY LAW CASES
by
Russell i Weintraub *
T HE recently enacted Texas Family Code long-arm provisions, sections
3.26' and 11.051,2 raise substantial problems of construction. This
Article first sketches the basic jurisdictional concepts affecting divorce, cus-
tody, and support. Particular attention is given to the reasons why per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse is important and has been
made even more important by Shaffer v. Heitner,3 a United States
Supreme Court decision of June 1977. Sections 3.26 and 11.051 and their
application are then analyzed in the light of three factors: (1) the purposes
* B.A., New York University; J.D., Harvard University. Marrs McLean Professor of
Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. This Article is a modified version of an
address at the State Bar of Texas Advanced Family Law Course in Houston, Texas, July 26,
1978. Professor John J. Sampson of the University of Texas at Austin School of Law gave
valuable counsel in the preparation of this Article.
I. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1978):
§ 3.26 Acquiring Jurisdiction over Nonresident Respondent
(a) If the petitioner is a resident or a domiciliary of this state at the com-
mencement of a suit for divorce, annulment, or to declare a marriage void, the
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent, or the respon-
dent's personal representative, although the respondent is not a resident or a
domiciliary of this state if:
(I) this state is the last state in which marital cohabitation between petitioner
and the respondent occurred and the suit is commenced within two years after
the date on which cohabitation ended; or (2) notwithstanding Subdivision
(1) above, there is any basis consistent with the constitution of this state or the
United States for the exercise of the personal jurisdiction.
(b) A court acquiring jurisdiction under this section also acquires jurisdic-
tion in a suit affecting the parent-child relation if Section 11.051 of this code is
applicable.
2. Id 11.051:
§ 11.051. Acquiring Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a person on whom service of citation is required or over
the person's personal representative, although the person is not a resident or
domiciliary of this state, if:
(1) the child was conceived in this state and the person on whom service is
required is a parent or an alleged or probable father of the child;
(2) the child resides in this state, as defined by Section 11.04 of this code,
as a result of the acts or directives or with the approval of the person on whom
service is required;
(3) the person on whom service is required has resided with the child in
this state; or
(4) notwithstanding Subdivisions (1), (2), or (3) above, there is any basis
consistent with the constitutions of this state or the United States for the exer-
cise of the personal jurisdiction.
3. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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of these sections; (2) the relationship of these sections to Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 108; and (3) the May 1978 United States Supreme Court
case, Kulko v. Superior Court,' which substantially raised the jurisdictional
hurdle. Several clarifying amendments to sections 3.26 and 11.051 are
suggested. As this Article shows, however, these are but stopgap meas-
ures. The proliferating Texas long-arm provisions need to be reworked
and consolidated.
I. BASIC JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPTS IN DIVORCE, CUSTODY, SUPPORT
A. Ex Parte Divorce Without Personal Jurisdiction over a Nonresident
Spouse
Williams I Williams v. North Carolina' (often called "Williams " to dis-
tinguish it from another case between the same parties decided three years
later6) is the base upon which to build any understanding of jurisdiction in
family law matters. Williams I held that a court in the state where one of
the spouses is domiciled can grant a valid divorce. This was so even
though the forum state had no other connection with the spouses or the
marriage; the forum state was never the marital domicile, did not have
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse, and was not the place
where any of the events that were grounds for divorce occurred.
Section 3.21 of the Family Code. The domiciliary basis for divorce in
Texas is contained in section 3.21 of the Family Code, which permits
bringing a divorce suit if either spouse "has been a domiciliary of this state
for the preceding six-month period and a resident of the county in which
suit is filed for the preceding ninety-day period." 7 Thus, as in most states,
Texas builds a durational requirement on the domiciliary basis. Not only
must one of the spouses be domiciled in Texas, but also this domicile must
be maintained for a specified period of time: six months in the state and
ninety days in the county.
Section 3.21 is an unusual statutory provision in that it uses the word
"domiciliary" in defining the six-month durational requirement. When a
statute uses the word "domicile" or, as in this case, "domiciliary," it is
reasonably certain that a meaning synonymous with the technical require-
ment of domicile is intended. Domicile is one of the key concepts pervad-
ing the field of conflict of laws. In order to acquire a domicile of choice in
a particular state a person must be physically present in that state with a
present, unqualified intention to make it "home," with all the connotations
of that word, for an indefinite time.8
4. 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978).
5. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
6. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975).
8. White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888) (indefinite time); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18, Comment b (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT] (present intention). Cf. id § 18: "To acquire a domicile of choice in a place, a person
must intend to make that place his home for the time at least."
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Section 3.21, however, switches to the term "resident" for the ninety-day
period that is required in the county in which suit is filed. Resident is a
far more common statutory term than domicile. The use of the term,
however, raises a threshold question of statutory construction.9 Does resi-
dent mean exactly the same as domiciliary, or does it mean technical dom-
icile plus something else, or, perhaps, simple physical presence without the
need for domiciliary intention? The Texas courts have construed resident
in the divorce context to mean technical domicile plus actual, physical,
continuous living in the county in which suit is filed, with the continuity of
this physical presence unbroken except perhaps by a temporary absence.'°
One statutory exception to this continual ninety-day residence requirement
is provided in section 3.22." Time spent by a Texas domiciliary outside
the state in the service of the armed forces or in other service of Texas or
the United States does not break the durational residence required for sec-
tion 3.21.
Other Basesfor Divorce Jurisdiction. Domicile of one of the spouses is
sufficient for constitutional, divorce jurisdiction, and has sometimes been
declared a necessary basis for divorce jurisdiction.12 The latter, however,
is almost surely not true. There are other contacts between a state and one
of the spouses that give that state a reasonable interest in determining the
marital status of that spouse. A good example is contained in section 3.23
of the Family Code, which provides that persons not previously resident in
Texas will be deemed to have acquired a residence in the state for divorce
purposes while they are stationed at military installations in Texas. 13
B. Why Personal Jurisdiction over a Nonresident Spouse is Desirable
Although Williams I held that jurisdiction over the absent spouse is not
necessary for a valid divorce, there are four reasons why personal jurisdic-
tion is either essential or highly desirable.
Collateral Attack. Three years after deciding Williams I the Supreme
Court indicated that there was something it had forgotten to mention.
One spouse, solely on the basis of his or her domicile in the forum, can
obtain a valid divorce. If, however, the divorcing court does not have
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse, that spouse can make a
collateral attack on the divorce court's jurisdictional finding of domicile.' 4
The "domicile of choice" is distinguished from the "domicile of origin" acquired at birth
and the "domicile of a minor," the latter two being determined by the domicile of the child's
parents. Id §§ 14, 22.
9. See Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1953).
10. See, e.g., Beavers v. Beavers, 543 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no
writ).
11. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.22 (Vernon 1975).
12. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (dictum).
13. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (Vernon 1975). The serviceperson's divorce provi-
sion was held constitutional in Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
14. Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279 (1945). Although Williams v. North
Carolina (Williams I), 325 U.S. 226 (1945), decided the same day as Esenwein, is often cited
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Suppose, for example, a Texas husband leaves his wife and children in
Texas and goes to Nevada for a "quickie" divorce. He resides in a motel
for the requisite six weeks and then, armed with his divorce decree giving
his "domicile" as Nevada, he returns to Texas. Thereupon, his wife sues
him for divorce in a Texas court. The husband objects on the grounds
that he has a valid Nevada divorce to which a Texas court must give full
faith and credit. If, however, the wife can bear the burden of proving that
the Nevada jurisdictional determination was erroneous because the hus-
band's purported "domicile" in Nevada was a fraud and a sham, then she
may do so consistently with full faith and credit. The reason why she may
make this collateral attack is that the Nevada court did not have personal
jurisdiction over her. This highlights, of course, one reason why personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse is highly desirable; it cuts off the
possibility of this kind of collateral attack on the basic jurisdictional find-
ing of domicile. 5
Money Judgments. In order to grant a valid money judgment against the
nonresident spouse, the divorce court must have personal jurisdiction over
that spouse.' 6 In Texas, money judgments incident to a divorce proceed-
ing would include temporary support for a spouse, 17 costs,' 8 attorney's
fees,' 9 and child support.2" In other states, divorce decrees might include
permanent alimony and division of the couple's out-of-state property, in-
cluding real property. A court with personal jurisdiction over both
spouses may validly adjudicate their rights in real estate situated outside
the forum.2' Although there is substantial confusion over whether these
nonsitus land decrees are entitled to full faith and credit,22 a Texas court
will, as a matter of comity, recognize interests in Texas land declared by
the divorce court of another state if that court had personal jurisdiction
over husband and wife.23 Unfortunately, however, the Texas courts have
not issued similar decrees dividing out-of-state land incident to a divorce
between Texas spouses.24
for this proposition, Williams HI involved a collateral attack on a Nevada divorce by the
state of North Carolina in a bigamy prosecution.
15. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 77(1).
17. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon 1975).
18. Id § 3.65.
19. See, e.g., Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.18(a) (Vernon 1975) (suit affecting parent-
child relationship).
20. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05(5) (Vernon 1975).
21. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 55.
22. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 305-10 (1971).
23. McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961).
24. See, e.g., Kaherl v. Kaherl, 357 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ).
But cf. Lopez v. Lopez, No. 15,788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio Apr. 20, 1977, no writ)
(Mississippi property divided pursuant to agreement of spouses submitting it to forum's ju-
risdiction); Estabrook v. Wise, 506 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler),pudgm't set aside and
cause dism'd as moot, 519 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1974) (trial court had jurisdiction to require
former husband to convey legal title to mineral rights in land located in Alabama and Flor-
ida).
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Personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse, in order to obtain a
valid money judgment entitled to full faith and credit, is especially impor-
tant in the light of the June 1977 United States Supreme Court decision,
Shaffer v. Heitner. 25 Before Shaffer, when the plaintiff could not obtain
personal jurisdiction over a defendant common practice was to search for
property of the defendant in the forum. If the plaintiff found property in
the state, he could seize the property, prove out his claim, and then apply
the proceeds of the judicial sale of the property to his claim, even though
his claim against the defendant was unrelated to the property. Shaffer
signals an end to this practice unless the claim is directly related to the
property. For example, a court in a state where property is situated can
adjudicate a dispute as to the ownership of the property,26 at least in cases
in which the property has not been brought into the state by the unilateral
act of the plaintiff.27 The court may also be able to adjudicate claims
arising from the presence of the property in the state. For example, if the
plaintiff is injured because of the negligent maintenance of real estate in
the state, the plaintiff can presumably seize the property as a basis for ad-
judicating his tort action against the absent owner.28
Shaffer was a derivative stockholder suit against the directors of a Dela-
ware corporation.29 The corporation was headquartered in Arizona and
engaged in activities in Oregon that subjected it to criminal and civil anti-
trust penalties. The suit was to recover the damages to the corporation
resulting from the illegal activities. All of the directors were nonresidents
of Delaware. In order to bring suit in Delaware, the plaintiff stockholder
seized the directors' stock, stock options, warrants, and various other
rights. The defendants made a special appearance urging that the seques-
tration of their property violated due process. When the defendants lost
in the Delaware state courts they appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
One might have expected the Supreme Court to have taken either of two
polar approaches. Judgment might have been rendered for the defendants
on the ground that the unique Delaware rule that made Delaware the situs
for sequestration purposes of stock in a Delaware corporation, even
though negotiable stock certificates were located outside the state,3° was
too bizarre and unfair to stand due process scrutiny." Alternatively, the
plaintiff might have prevailed on the ground that since the state of incor-
poration should be able to obtain personal jurisdiction over corporate di-
25. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
26. Id at 207.
27. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 82.
28. 433 U.S. at 208. If the forum has an appropriate long-arm statute, personal juris-
diction over the absent owner will also be available to adjudicate claims arising from inju-
ries on the property. See, e.g., Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61
(Philadelphia Co. 1938).
29. Some of the defendants were directors of a subsidiary of the Delaware corporation.
The subsidiary was a California corporation.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 324 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-317(1) (1975).
31. Mr. Justice Stevens concurred on this ground. 433 U.S. at 217-19.
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rectors in suits alleging breach of their fiduciary obligations to the
corporation,32 it should not matter that Delaware chose to permit assertion
of this claim by quasi in rem jurisdiction over the directors' corporate
holdings rather than by personal jurisdiction over the directors. The
Court, however, used Shaffer to deliver a mortal blow to quasi in rem
jurisdiction generally, overruling such casebook standards as Harris v.
Balk.3 3 Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court concluded "that all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction [including quasi in rem jurisdiction]
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny."34
Without the availability of quasi in rem jurisdiction to seize the property
of a nonresident spouse, the importance of obtaining personal jurisdiction
over that spouse for enforceable money awards incident to family law liti-
gation is increased. Some money judgments rendered in domestic rela-
tions cases are final lump sum awards that easily fit within our notion of
full faith and credit. Lump sum judgments in Texas might cover such
matters as court costs and attorney's fees.35 In states that have permanent
alimony there may be on occasion a final judgment settling one spouse's
rights to future alimony. Some money judgments in family disputes, how-
ever, are in the form of modifiable installments. In Texas such judgments
might be for child support and in other states for permanent alimony.
The installments ordered, usually a monthly amount, are subject to modifi-
cation in the light of changed circumstances on the motion of either party.
The question arises how full faith and credit can be accorded to such mod-
ifiable and therefore nonfinal judgments. The answer is that the install-
ments, when they become past due and no longer modifiable under the law
of the state that granted them, are entitled to full faith and credit just as are
any other money judgments.36
It is unclear under the Family Code at what point Texas support orders
are entitled to full faith and credit in sister states. Under section 14.08(C)
37
Texas child support payments now become vested and absolute as they fall
due and may be modified only prospectively. On the other hand, section
14.09(c) 38 provides that after ten days' notice a judgment in the amount of
the unpaid installments may be rendered against a party who has failed to
make ordered child support payments. The judgment then "may be en-
forced by any means available for the enforcement of judgments for
debts."' 39 A sister state might take the position that the fact that unpaid
Texas child support installments may not be modified retroactively does
32. Mr. Justice Marshall's majority opinion casts doubt upon this assertion. Id at 215-
16. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented from this portion of the opinion. Id at 219-28.
33. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
34. 433 U.S. at 212. For the International Shoe standards, see text accompanying notes
67 & 68 infra.
35. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
36. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
37. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c) (Vernon 1975).
38. Id § 14.09(c).
39. Id
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not mean that they are final for full faith and credit purposes until a judg-
ment is rendered pursuant to section 14.09(c).
Although a Texas court cannot award permanent alimony and although
permanent alimony awards of other states cannot be enforced under the
Texas Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA),4° a
Texas court must give full faith and credit to final, nonmodifiable alimony
installments awarded by the court of another state with personal jurisdic-
tion over the obligor spouse.4'
Divisible Divorce. The "divisible divorce" doctrine, articulated in Estin v.
Estin42 and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,43 provides another reason for seeking
jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse. If the divorce court does not have
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, it cannot determine that spouse's rights
to alimony or support. This was the basic compromise worked out by the
United States Supreme Court between the needs of the domicile of one
spouse to determine the marital status of that spouse and the needs of the
former marital domicile to provide support for a spouse and children
abandoned there.44 The converse of this proposition is that if the divorce
court has jurisdiction over both spouses, it can settle and, if it wishes, ter-
minate their rights to future support.
One apparent anomaly in the workings of full faith and credit is the last-
in-time rule. Occasions arise when two states, each with jurisdiction over
both parties, render final and conflicting judgments. If the first judgment
was properly pleaded, the judgment second in time has denied full faith
and credit to the first judgment. But on a theory akin to "two wrongs do
not make a right" it is now the second judgment, the last-in-time, that is
entitled to full faith and credit, even in the state that rendered the first
judgment.4 5
A good illustration of this last-in-time rule is provided by Layton v.
Layton.46  A husband and wife were living in Texas where the husband
was serving in the armed forces. They separated and the wife went to
Maryland with the children. The husband filed suit for divorce in Texas
and the wife was served in Maryland. She made a special appearance in
Texas to urge that there was no personal jurisdiction over her, but she lost
and did not appeal. A divorce decree was granted to the husband. In the
meantime, the wife had started a suit for divorce in Maryland seeking cus-
tody of the children, child support, and alimony. While the husband was
40. Id. §§ 21.03(6), 21.21.
41. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
42. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
43. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
44. The divisible divorce doctrine may be used by the absent spouse's domicile at the
time of the ex parte divorce even though this was not the marital domicile. Vanderbilt v.
Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 114. But see Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d
1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962) (refuses to follow Maryland judgment declaring Ne-
vada divorce void).
46. 538 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ refd n.r.e.), noted in 55
TEXAS L. REV. 127 (1976).
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temporarily in Maryland, service of process in the Maryland suit was
made on his father. The husband made a special appearance in the Mary-
land court claiming that there was no jurisdiction over him. The husband
lost his special appearance and did not take any further part in the Mary-
land proceedings. After the Texas divorce decree, the Maryland court en-
tered a judgment granting the wife custody of the children, child support,
and permanent alimony. The Maryland court held, contrary to the find-
ings in the Texas special appearance proceeding, that the Texas decree was
invalid for lack of jurisdiction over the wife. The wife reduced past due
installments of child support and alimony to judgment in Maryland and
then sued on this judgment in Texas, demanding that the Maryland decree
be given full faith and credit. The San Antonio court of civil appeals held
that even if Maryland denied full faith and credit to the Texas judgment,
this did not justify a Texas court's denying full faith and credit to the
Maryland judgment. The husband's remedy for the error of the Maryland
court, even an error of full faith and credit proportions, was to appeal the
Maryland judgment in a direct attack. He could not let the Maryland
judgment become final and then wage a collateral attack on it when en-
forcement was sought in Texas.
Custody Award Binding on the Absent Parent. Custody decrees are of
course modifiable. Whether such decrees are technically entitled to full
faith and credit is debatable.47 Even assuming they are, this can be an
empty requirement in the light of the ease with which a determined court
can find "changed circumstances"" and thus modify the custody decree.
The fact is, nevertheless, that more and more state courts, including the
Texas courts, have evidenced a reluctance to modify sister state custody
decrees, particularly if the petitioning parent is holding the children in the
forum in violation of a sister state decree. The snatch, run, and litigate
process that results when parents use children as weapons to inflict wounds
on one another has been a national disgrace and many judges have indi-
cated that they will no longer tolerate it.49
One difficulty is that May v. Anderson,5 ° the leading United States
47. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
48. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Brengle v. Hurst,
408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966) (can find changed circumstances only three months after sister
state decree).
49. See, e.g., Hood v. Hood, 566 S.W.2d 743 (Ark. 1978); Young v. District Court, 570
P.2d 249 (Colo. 1977); Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168
(1977); Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978) (Texas court must grant writ of
habeas corpus to parent seeking to enforce sister state custody decree unless exceptions of
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1978) apply). See also UNIFORM CHILD CUS-
TODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 8, 13, 14 (placing substantial restrictions on the modification of
sister state decrees, adopted in 17 states); Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems.- Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Ex-
cessive Modpications, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 978 (1977). But cf. Copple v. Copple, 186 Neb.
696, 185 N.W.2d 846 (1971) (deny "morally unfit" mother's habeas corpus petition); In re
Marriage of Settle, 276 Ore. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976) ("best interests of child" justify modifi-
cation of sister state custody decree although child was wrongfully removed to the forum).
50. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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Supreme Court decision on full faith and credit to custody decrees, leaves
unclear whether a state can even voluntarily defer to another state's out-
standing custody decree and remit an unsatisfied parent to the courts of
that state for any modification if the first court did not have personal juris-
diction over the contesting parent.5 In order to avoid this difficult consti-
tutional debate, it is important that the court awarding custody have
personal jurisdiction over both parents.
II. RECENT ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE LONG-ARM
PROVISIONS
A. Background
Thus, although one spouse can obtain a valid ex parte divorce, there are
many reasons why having personal jurisdiction over the other spouse is
important: to cut off collateral attack on the jurisdictional finding of domi-
cile, to obtain a valid money judgment entitled to full faith and credit, and
to effect a binding determination of a spouse's support and custody rights.
Two recent additions to the Family Code facilitate acquisition of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident: sections 3.26 and 11.051.52
Reasons for Special Family Code Long-Arm Provisions. For almost
twenty years Texas has had a far-ranging long-arm statute in article 203 1b
of the civil statutes.53 This article provides for jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent entities for causes of action arising out of their doing business in
Texas and then defines "doing business" in the following expansive man-
ner: "[W]ithout including other acts that may constitute doing business,
. ..entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to
be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State, or the com-
mitting of any tort in whole or in part in this State."54 Although family
disputes might be squeezed by ingenious advocacy into the "tort"55 or
"contract" long-arm provisions, and although the peculiar phrase "without
including other acts that may constitute doing business" might in time
have been construed to be an open-ended inclusion of all events or conse-
quences in Texas that would constitutionally permit personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents, 56 the pressing needs of family law litigation made it
imperative that there be special long-arm provisions designed for use in
the Family Code.
51. Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissent, assumed that the holding prevented voluntary
recognition. Id. at 536-37. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the majority opinion,
thought voluntary recognition permissible. Id. at 535-36.
52. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
53. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
54. Id § 4.
55. But see Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Public Welfare, 549 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.) ("tortious act" provision not applicable to alleged
nonresident father because sexual intercourse between consenting adults is not a tort).
56.- See Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction. Article 2031B, the Texas "'Long Arm" Jurisdic-
tion Statute and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS
L. REV. 279, 307-08 (1964).
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While sections 3.26 and 11.051 were being drafted, the Texas Supreme
Court was amending Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 108 to turn it into a
general long-arm provision. Sections 3.26 and 11.051 took effect on Sep-
tember 1, 1975, and the amended rule 108 became effective on January 1,
1976. 57
Rule 108. Rule 108 provides that the citation with a copy of the petition
attached may be served on a defendant absent from the state "by any dis-
interested person. . . in the same manner as provided in Rule 106. '' s A
defendant so served
shall be required to appear and answer in the same manner and time
and under the same penalties as if he had been personally served with
a citation within this State to the full extent that he may be required to
appear and answer under the Constitution of the United States in an
action either in rem or in personam.5 9
In other words, the long-arm reach of a Texas court is now as long as due
60process permits.
Rule 108 and Sections 3.26 and 11.051. One problem that arises is the
relationship between rule 108 and the long-arm provisions of the Family
Code. Two polar views are reasonably arguable. It could be contended
that sections 3.26 and 11.051 are exclusively applicable to family law cases
and that they supersede and exclude the application of rule 108 to such
cases. On the other hand, it is arguable that rule 108 is a general long-arm
provision applicable to all causes of action including family law cases, and
that there is no inconsistency between rule 108 and the Family Code long-
arm provisions, especially in the light of the fact that sections 3.26 and
11.051 each end with a catch-all anything-due-process-permits provision
mirroring the breadth of rule 108.
A similar divergence of views is possible concerning the relationship be-
tween the specific and the catch-all provisions of sections 3.26 and 11.051.
Section 3.26 provides one specific factual situation and section 11.051 three
situations in which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over absent par-
ties. Each section then has a provision providing for jurisdiction on "any
basis consistent with the constitutions of this state or the United States.'
A narrow interpretation of these sections would be that the specific provi-
sion is controlling on any facts related to it and that the catch-all provision
is applicable only in other circumstances. For example, section 3.26, cov-
ering jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent in a suit for divorce, an-
57. Long-arm statutes, affecting "procedure," may constitutionally be given retroactive
effect. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also Zeisler v.
Zeisler, 553 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd) (assuming without dis-
cussion that rule 108 and § 11.051 can be applied retroactively).
58. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
59. Id.
60. The note appended to explain the amendment to rule 108 reads: "Its purpose is to
permit acquisition of inpersonam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits." Supreme Court
of Texas Order of July 22, 1975, Adopting Amendments, at 4.
61. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26(a)(2), 11.051(4). (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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nulment, or to declare a marriage void, provides for such jurisdiction in
the specific situation in which Texas was the state of last marital cohabita-
tion and the suit is commenced within two years after the cohabitation
ended. If suit is commenced two years and one month after cohabitation
has ended, it can be contended that jurisdiction is not available, even
though the one month is not enough to make a difference in the larger due
process context.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the specific situations enumer-
ated in the Family Code long-arm provisions are nothing more than a
handy checklist of typical circumstances in which jurisdiction will be avail-
able over absent parties well within due process limits. The specific provi-
sions are not intended to limit in any way the full due process reach of the
sections. This more expansive reading is supported by the fact that both
catch-all provisions begin with the admonition that they apply "notwith-
standing" the more specific provisions of the prior subdivision or subdivi-
sions.62
The Family Code long-arm provisions should be applied to the due
process limits. Nothing in the wording of sections 3.26 and 11.051 pre-
vents this. Moreover, the overwhelming tendency, both in Texas 63 and
nationally,' 4 has been to construe long-arm statutes to their constitutional
limits. It might help to insure this construction if the due process catch-all
provisions in sections 3.26 and 11.051 were moved to the beginning and
the wording were changed slightly. For example, subdivision (a)(1) of
section 3.26 and subdivision (1) of section 11.051 should read: "there is any
basis consistent with the Constitution of the United States for the exercise
62. See Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978,
no writ). Section 11.051 was held to confer jurisdiction over a mother who had resided in
Texas with her children, but had left that state with the children before her husband had
filed his suit for divorce and custody in Texas. The court said that section 11.051 provides
jurisdiction "if the person on whom service is required has resided with the child in this
state, and even where the section might otherwise be deemed inapplicable, if there is any basis
consistent with the constitutions of this state or the United States for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction." Id. at 430 (emphasis added). The mother had filed suit for separate mainte-
nance and custody in Illinois, but an Illinois court has ordered her to deliver the children to
the father in accordance with the Texas decree. Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 379 N.E.2d 738
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978). For commentary on sections 3.26 and 11.051, see McKnight, Husband
and Wfe, Texas Family Code Symposium Supplement, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 10 (1976);
Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and Conservatorship Suits, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159 (1976);
Smith, Parent and Child, Texas Family Code Symposium Supplement, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV.
19, 26 (1976).
63. See U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 1235, 55 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1978):
Article 2031 b reaches as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due
process will permit. . . .Furthermore, such a construction is desirable in that
it allows the courts to focus on the constitutional limitations of due process
rather than to engage in technical and abstruse attempts to consistently define
'doing business.'
The court nevertheless held that jurisdiction could not be exercised over the defendant.
64. See, e.g., Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 438 P.2d 135 (1968). But see Kramer v.
Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966).
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of the personal jurisdiction."65 Then the remaining subdivisions of sec-
tions 3.26 and 11.051 should be introduced with the statement: "Without
limiting the effect of subdivision [(a)(1) or (1)], personal jurisdiction is
available if:".
Long-Arm Theory. So-called "long-arm statutes" have proliferated in the
last thirty years. What is the theoretical basis for such enactments?
When can the court of a state reach out its arm, grab a defendant in a
distant state, and say "come here and defend yourself or we will render a
judgment against you in your absence that is entitled to full faith and
credit"? The general form of the answer is easily stated but often difficult
to apply to particular situations. A court may exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant for causes of action arising out of acts the defendant
has committed in the state or out of consequences that the defendant has
caused in the state by acts that he committed outside the state when, in the
light of those acts and consequences, it is reasonable to do SO. 66 The
landmark United States Supreme Court decision of International Shoe Co.
v. Washington67 held that in order to obtain jurisdiction over an absent
defendant it is necessary only that the defendant have "certain minimum
contacts" with the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ,6
There is, however, an important counterweight to the expansive spirit of
International Shoe. Hanson v. Denckla,69 involving a complex estate liti-
gation, indicated that state courts could not completely ignore state lines in
obtaining jurisdiction over absent parties. Due process was held still to
have a substantial limiting effect on the courts' long-arm reach. Specifi-
cally, "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the de-
fendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws."7
Despite Hanson, the trend has been toward more and more long-arm
legislation and the new Family Code provisions are part of this trend.
B. Section 3.26. Nonresident Respondent in Divorce or Annulment
Section 3.26 is the simpler of the two Family Code long-arm provisions.
It provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent in a suit for di-
vorce, for annulment, or to declare a marriage void. Its only specific pro-
vision, that the last "marital cohabitation" was in Texas and suit be within
two years thereafter, is almost surely within due process limits if "marital
cohabitation" is construed to require cohabitation coupled with technical
65. As in rule 108, the reference to the Texas Constitution is removed because the focus
is on federal due process limitations.
66. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 24, 27.
67. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
68. Id. at 316.
69. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
70. Id. at 253.
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domiciliary intention7' or, at least, a long-continued period of actual resi-
dence. It cannot validly be applied to a nonresident couple who sojourn
in Texas and then go their separate ways. The proper application of sec-
tion 3.26(a)(1) could be clarified by rewording it to read: "this state is the
last marital residence of petitioner and respondent and the suit is com-
menced within two years after the date on which marital residence ended."
The puzzling part of section 3.26 is subsection (b), which provides: "A
court acquiring jurisdiction under this section also acquires jurisdiction in
a suit affecting the parent-child relation if Section 11.051 of this Code is
applicable." At first glance this seems to mean that section 3.26 does not
confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent for purposes of
custody and support; section 11.051 must be used in those suits. This
reading may not be necessary and is undesirable. If jurisdiction over the
nonresident respondent can be obtained under section 3.26, it should be
available for all adjudications that are properly incident to the divorce or
annulment. Few adjudications are more important in this context than
those affecting custody and child support. Sections 3.26 and 11.051 both
have catch-all due process provisions and one should not limit the other.
It would, of course, be a rare case in which Texas would be the state of
last marital residence and one of the specific provisions enumerated in
subdivisions (1) through (3) of section 11.051 were not applicable. Never-
theless, such a case could occur. For example, if the child were born in
Texas six months after the husband and wife had moved to Texas but the
birth was after the father had left the state, the abandoned wife certainly
ought to have jurisdiction over the father for both divorce and child sup-
port. To fit the case within subdivisions (1) through (3) of section 11.051
would, however, be difficult. To avoid this problem, section 3.26(b)
should be amended to read: "A court acquiring jurisdiction under this sec-
tion also acquires jurisdiction over the respondent to affect the parent-
child relation. For additional provisions conferring jurisdiction in a suit
affecting the parent-child relation, see Section 11.051."
C. Section 101.051." Nonresident Party in Suit Affecting Child Custody and
Support
Section 11.051 is more complex than section 3.26. It contains three spe-
cifically enumerated situations that are intended in the vast majority of
cases to be safely within due process limits. As compared with the provi-
sions of section 3.26, however, it is easier to apply the checklist provisions
in an unconstitutional manner, and the second specific provision is seri-
ously circumscribed by Kulko v. Superior Court.7
The three specific situations are: (1) the child was conceived in the state,
and the person on whom service is required is a parent or probable father;
71. See Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1977,
no writ), holding that section 3.26(a)(1) confers jurisdiction over a nonresident wife who had
resided with her husband in Texas for two and one half months.
72. 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978).
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(2) the child "resides" in Texas within the meaning of section 11.0473 "as a
result of the acts or directives or with the approval of the person on whom
service is required"; and (3) the person on whom service is required has
resided with the child in Texas.
The checklist provisions must be applied with care to avoid exceeding
due process limits. For example, the first provision provides jurisdiction
when the child was conceived in Texas and the defendant is a parent or
probable father. This is designed to cover the typical case in which juris-
diction is desirable and fair: the defendant has impregnated a Texan in
Texas and has left the state. If the provision is applied literally, however,
it could apply unconstitutionally to a nonresident couple honeymooning in
Texas who leave Texas after the honeymoon. Section 11.051(1) should be
clarified by adding the italicized words: "conceived in this state while at
least one parent was a resident of this state."
Section 11.051 contains no internal time limitation similar to the two-
year limit of section 3.26. Corliss v. Smith7 4 held that exercise of jurisdic-
tion under section 11.051 over a mother who had been absent from the
state with her children for over three years would be a violation of due
process, even though the mother had resided with the children in Texas,
the section 11.051(3) circumstance, and the children had been conceived in
Texas, the section 11.051(1) circumstance. This result would certainly
have been sound if the suit were an original custody action and is sound
even though Corliss involved a motion by the husband to amend a prior
Texas custody decree.
The court noted that "[n]o contention is made that jurisdiction can be
had pursuant to section 11.05 of the Family Code."75 That is the section
conferring "continuing jurisdiction" on a court that once has acquired ju-
risdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Perhaps the
claim of continuing jurisdiction under section 11.05 was not made because
the first proceeding in Corliss was before the enactment of section 11.05.76
The concept of "continuing jurisdiction," however, existed in Texas long
before section 11.05 . 7 7 Nevertheless, it would have been an abuse of di-
cretion to utilize this continuing jurisdiction on the facts of Corliss. The
73. This cross-reference to § 11.04 creates additional complications. See section III(B)
of the text infta.
74. 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
75. Id. at 170.
76. See, e.g., Zeisler v. Zeisler, 553 S.W.2d 927, 928 n. I (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, 1977,
writ dism'd): "Appellant does not rely on the concept of continuing jurisdiction under Tex.
Family Code Ann. § 11.05 (Vernon Supp. 1976), since the divorce decree was issued before
enactment of Title 2 of the Code in 1973." In Zeisler the court held that it had jurisdiction
under section 11.051 to increase support payments although all parties had resided out of
Texas for about four years. The court thought this justifiable because Texas was the last
marital domicile, although it noted that this was not required for application of section
11.051, and no other forum was more convenient for both parties in the light of the fact that
at the time of the suit the mother and children resided in Georgia and the father in Florida.
553 S.W.2d at 930.
77. See, e.g., Tharp v. Tharp, 438 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1969, writ dism'd) (continuing jurisdiction to make provision for child support).
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proper forum for the father's attempt to drastically increase his visitation
rights was Nebraska, where the mother and children had resided since they
left Texas. The court's reasoning is cogent in noting that section 11.06 of
the Family Code provides for intrastate transfer of a suit affecting the par-
ent-child relationship if the child has principally resided for six months or
more in a county other than the one in which the action was instituted.
The court then states:
We see no reason why the same considerations should not be applied
in an interstate context involving section 11.051. Therefore, in deter-
mining whether to assert jurisdiction, when the undisputed proof
shows that the child and the managing conservator have resided in a
foreign state for six months or more before the suit was filed, we think
a presumption arises that the Texas courts no longer constitute conve-
nient and/or competent forums to adjudicate claims affecting the par-
ent-child relationship and have lesser interest in protecting the welfare
of the child than the foreign state, and are consequently unwarranted
in asserting jurisdiction in the absence of sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption.78
III. KULKO V. SUPERIOR COURT
A. Kulko and Section 11. 051
Mr. and Mrs. Kulko had their marital domicile in New York for thirteen
years and were the parents of a daughter and a son. They agreed upon a
separation. The wife moved to California where, coincidentally, they had
been married while both were New York domiciliaries but while the hus-
band was there briefly en route to overseas military duty. Under the sepa-
ration agreement the children were to remain with the father during most
of the year and spend vacations with the mother. The father agreed to
pay $3,000 a year in child support for the brief periods when the children
were with the mother. The mother obtained a Haitian divorce which in-
corporated the terms of the separation agreement. The wife appeared in
person in Haiti and the husband filed a power of attorney and submission
to jurisdiction. After obtaining the Haitian divorce the mother returned to
California. The daughter told her father that she wished to live with her
mother and her father acceded to her wishes. He purchased a one-way
ticket to California for her and allowed her to take her personal belong-
ings. About two years later, the son, without his father's knowledge or
permission, flew to California using a ticket provided by his mother. The
mother now had the responsibility of caring for the children during most
of the year and found the $3,000 child support payments, designed for
different circumstances, inadequate. She brought suit against the father in
California to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judg-
ment, to modify the judgment to obtain full custody of the children, and to
increase the father's child support obligations. The father made a special
appearance claiming that California could not constitutionally assert per-
78. 560 S.W.2d at 173.
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sonal jurisdiction over him so as to affect his support obligations. The
California courts ruled against the father, holding that there was surely
jurisdiction with regard to the daughter's support obligations because the
father had voluntarily sent her to California. Also, since there was juris-
diction over the father with regard to one child, it was only fair and rea-
sonable that there should be jurisdiction over him with regard to his
support obligations for both children.
The United States Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, Mr. Justice
Marshall writing for the Court, reversed the California judgments and
held that exercising personal jurisdiction over the father violated due proc-
ess. The father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live with her
mother was not enough to subject him to California jurisdiction. A con-
trary finding "would discourage parents from entering into reasonable vis-
itation agreements."79 "To make jurisdiction in a case such as this turn on
whether [the father] bought his daughter her ticket or instead unsuccess-
fully sought to prevent her departure would impose an unreasonable bur-
den on family relations ..8. "" Mr. Justice Marshall found controlling
the famous language in Hanson v. Denckla:
"The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State. . . .[I]t is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposely avails [him]self of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State .... .",
There are two respects in which Kulko seems to restrict the availability
of personal jurisdiction in family law cases. First, the facts of Kulko
seemed reasonably favorable to the mother's obtaining jurisdiction over
the father. The father did after all purchase the one-way ticket for his
daughter and send her to California with her personal belongings. Kulko
would not be as troublesome if the contacts with California resulted solely
from the mother's unilateral acts. Secondly, and perhaps more signifi-
cantly, Mr. Justice Marshall's reliance on Hanson v. Denckla gives that
case renewed emphasis as an important limitation on state court jurisdic-
tion.
Kulko seriously circumscribes the use of section 11.051(2), which pur-
ports to confer jurisdiction over an absent party in a suit for support or
custody when the child resides in Texas "as a result of the acts or directives
or with the approval of the person on whom service is required." To say
that in Kulko the daughter was in California "as a result of the acts. . . or
with the approval" of her father does not strain language beyond its nor-
mal meaning. In order to change the obligation of support a rather ex-
treme case will apparently now be needed to obtain jurisdiction over an
absent father who sends a child to live with the mother in Texas when the
father has no other contacts with Texas. It should still be possible to ob-
79. 98 S. Ct. at 1698, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 142.
80. Id. at 1700, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 145.
81. Id. at 1698, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 142 (quoting from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)).
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tain jurisdiction over the absent father if he sends the wife and child into
Texas promising to join them later, but then does not come and leaves his
family stranded without support.82
Kulko does not necessarily have the same circumscribing effect in suits
affecting the parent-child relationship if the object is not to change the
support obligation. Mr Kulko "did not contest the court's jurisdiction for
purposes of the custody determination."83 This could mean two quite dif-
ferent things. First, it could mean simply that Mr. Kulko conceded that
California had sufficient contacts with the children and their mother to
make an ex parte decree affecting custody.84 Secondly, it could mean that
Mr. Kulko did not contest the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him-
for the limited purpose of making a custody decree binding on him, thus
avoiding the May v. Anderson85 problems that would otherwise result. In
other words, California could have jurisdiction over Mr. Kulko for some
purposes affecting the parent-child relationship, such as custody, but not
for others, for example, changing the support obligation. This distinction
makes sense on the facts of Kulko. Mr. Kulko had acceded to a de facto
change in custody and it was only reasonable to enable California to make
the change binding on him de jure. Moreover, one of the reasons that Mr.
Justice Marshall gave for the result was that an alternative remedy was
available to modify, and enforce as modified, the support obligation: the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).8 6 The Act,
however, could not be used to modify an existing custody award.
It may also be that Kulko does not impose the same limitations on juris-
diction over a nonresident parent if the purpose of the suit is to enforce
existing support obligations rather than increase those obligations.8 7 It is
true that now URESA is available as a remedy.88 Perhaps, however, Mr.
Kulko had sufficient "minimum contacts" with California so that jurisdic-
tion would "not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice' "89 in the light of the substantially less onerous impact on Mr. Kulko
of enforcing an existing obligation as contrasted with increasing that obli-
gation. Mrs. Kulko could then have demanded full faith and credit for
her .California judgment for arrears rather than having to rely on URESA
remedies.
82. Cf. Lea v. Lea, 18 N.J. 1, 112 A.2d 540 (1955) (father who sent his wife and children
to New York was "domiciled" there for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over him to
award alimony and support to the abandoned wife and children).
83. 98 S. Ct. at 1695, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 139.
84. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 79(a) & (b) (custody jurisdiction exists if the
child is either domiciled in the forum or present there).
85. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
86. See section III(C) of the text infra.
87. See Boyer v. Boyer, 57 Ill. App. 3d 555, 373 N.E.2d 441 (1978) (decided before
Kulko, holding that resident mother can obtain personal jurisdiction over father still resi-
dent at former marital domicile but that jurisdiction is limited to enforcing arrears and does
not extend to modification).
88. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(b) (1968 revised ver-
sion), § 2() (1950 version).
89. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Because of these uncertainties as to the scope of Kulko, it may be well to
leave the last clause of section 11.051(2) alone for the time being while
recognizing that it cannot be applied literally when the object is to increase
existing support orders.
B. The Reference in Section 11.051(2) to Section 11.0490
Whether section 11.051(2) is applicable to the Kulko fact situation is not
clear. Subdivision 2 would apply only if the child resided in Texas "as
defined by Section 11.04." If the Haitian divorce were regarded as valid
and as having appointed a "custodian of the child" (the father), the child
would not reside in Texas under subdivision 5 of section 11.04(c) because
the custodian did not reside in Texas. Subdivision 4 would not apply be-
cause the adult "having care and control of the child" was a parent. It is
perhaps arguable that the child resides in Texas under subdivision 3 of
section 11.04(c) if: (1) the provision regarding parents who "do not reside
in the same county" applies when one parent resides in Texas and another
outside Texas, and (2) the separation agreement included in the Haitian
divorce is not regarded as the appointment of a "managing conservator
[or] guardian," either because the provision in subdivision 3 referring to a
managing conservator or guardian refers only to the appointment of such
persons by a Texas court or because the Haitian divorce decree is consid-
ered invalid for this purpose.
If the cross-reference to section 11.04 is retained in section 11.051(2),
section 11.04(c)(4) should be amended to remove the words "other than a
90. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.04 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1978).
§ 11.04. Venue
(c) A child resides in the county where his parents (or parent if only one
parent is living) reside, except that:
(1) if a managing conservator has been appointed by court order or
designated in an affidavit of relinquishment, or if a custodian for the child has
been appointed by order of a court before January 1, 1974, the child resides in
the county where the managing conservator or custodian resides;
(2) if a guardian of the person has been appointed by order of a county or
probate court and a managing conservator has not been appointed, the child
resides in the county where the guardian of the person resides;
(3) if the parents of the child do not reside in the same county and neither
a managing conservator nor a guardian of the person has been appointed, the
child resides in the county where the parent having care and control of the
child resides;
(4) if the child is under the care and control of an adult other than a
parent and (A) neither a managing conservator nor a guardian of the person
has been appointed or (B) the whereabouts of the managing conservator or the
guardian of the person is unknown or (C) the person whose residence
determines the residence of the child under this section has left the child under
the care and control of the adult, the child resides where the adult having care
and control of the child resides;
(5) if a guardian or custodian of the child has been appointed by order of
a court of another state or nation, the child resides in the county where the
guardian or custodian resides; or
(6) if it appears that the child is not under the care and control of an adult,
the child resides where he is found.
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parent." Unless this is done, none of the subdivisions of section 11.04(c)
will cover the situation in which the managing conservator lives outside
Texas and sends the child to live in Texas with the other parent. Without
this amendment it may be impossible to acquire personal jurisdiction over
the nonresident managing conservator under section 11.051 except, per-
haps, under subdivision 4, the due process catch-all provision. It may,
however, be better simply to delete from section 11.051(2) the cross-refer-
ence to section 11.04. Section 11.051(2) would then read: "the child re-
sides in this state as a result of the acts . . . ." This would leave the word
"resides" for judicial construction in the light of the purposes of section
11.051 and limit section 11.04 to the purpose for which it was designed, to
provide for intrastate venue.
C. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) as a
Remedy
Mr. Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Kulko was influenced by the
availability of URESA as a remedy to the California mother.9' Justice
Marshall indicated that the mother could file a petition for support under
URESA in California, have the California court send a copy of the peti-
tion to New York, and then have New York obtain jurisdiction over the
father and order him to pay increased support.
The use of URESA when Texas is the "responding state" may now be
more congenial to a petitioner who wishes to use his or her own attorney92
to press the claim. Section 21.03(15) of the Texas statute now permits
appointment of "an attorney designated by the court," in addition to dis-
trict and county attorneys.
D. Kulko and Catch-All Due Process Provisions
Mr. Justice Marshall remarks in his opinion that "California has not
attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying such cases in its
courts by, e.g., enacting a special jurisdictional statute."93 This is a refer-
ence to the fact that California's long-arm statute does not enumerate spe-
cific fact situations in which jurisdiction may be obtained but states simply
that the California courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction over ab-
sent parties on "any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution. 94
How a state necessarily manifests less "interest" in obtaining jurisdiction
over nonresidents by having a simple anything-due-process-permits long-
arm statute, rather than attempting to set out in detail all the specific situa-
tions in which due process is available, is difficult to understand. Section
91. 98 S. Ct. at 1700-01, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 145-46.
92. Whether a URESA petitioner may use private counsel when the Act does not con-
tain a provision for such representation, is a question that has seldom been litigated. See
Ball v. Haughton, 377 N.E.2d 78 (Ill. App. 1978) (petitioner's use of private attorney is
improper basis for dismissing URESA action); cf. Davis v. Davis, 246 Iowa 262, 67 N.W.2d
566 (1954) (private counsel permitted under Uniform Support of Dependents Law).
93. 98 S. Ct. at 1700, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 145.
94. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
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11.051 does combine three specific provisions with a final catch-all provi-
sion. This seems a very weak reed upon which to rest an argument that
Kulko does not apply to a Texas case that falls within one of the specific
section 11.051 provisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Personal jurisdiction over out-of-state parties remains either essential or
highly desirable for many family law adjudications. Kulko indicates that
the limits on long-arm jurisdiction in such matters are narrower than many
had thought desirable and possible in the light of modern social reali-
ties-a more mobile population and the greater ease of travel and commu-
nication. Nevertheless, there is no need for despair. The full scope of
Kulko is uncertain. It may not apply with the same force to changes in
custody or to judgments that seek merely to enforce existing support obli-
gations.
This Article has suggested several clarifying amendments to sections
3.26 and 11.051. Very soon, however, Texas must undertake the far more
substantial task of reviewing, consolidating, and overhauling its proliferat-
ing long-arm provisions. All long-arm provisions should be collected in a
single statute. At present there are two general multi-purpose long-arm
provisions, rule 108 and article 2031(b), the specialized Family Code pro-
visions in sections 3.26 and 11.051, a nonresident motorist statute,95 and
numerous other provisions designed to provide jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents.96 Finding them all is difficult. They do not form an integrated,
logical, and fair system of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Such an all-purpose long-arm statute, should contain an introductory
section that, like rule 108, makes it clear that jurisdiction reaches to the
due process limits. As a handy check list, the statute then should describe
frequently recurring situations in which extraterritorial personal jurisdic-
tion is desirable and fair and make it clear that this enumeration does not
limit the full due process scope ofjurisdiction. In addition, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens should be codified to make clear that Texas courts
need not, indeed should not, always exercise their jurisdiction over nonres-
idents to the limits of due process. The statute should also guide a, wise
and enlightened forum non conveniens discretion.97
Texas courts and lawyers deserve simpler and more coherent long-arm
legislation.
95. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (Vernon 1964).
96. See, e.g., id. arts. 2033a, 2033b, & 2033c (Vernon 1964); id. art. 2039b (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
97. A good starting point for forum non conveniens legislation is the statute suggested
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